Introduction: The Middle East and the American Idea of a World Order

The development of a common set of principles to govern Western relationships with Asiatic Moslem populations.... It seems to me that we must develop a set of principles to be observed by all three nations [the United States, Britain, and France] in their relationships with these great areas – principles that will take into account both the legitimate aspirations of these people and the practicalities of earning a living in the modern world. We should develop a program that would at least eliminate differences in essentials in our several approaches to all these people and a program which would be appealing vis-a-vis the Russians, who are in effect offering nothing but political and social revolution.... These three countries might well expand this idea to include relationships with other important parts of the world.¹

Dwight D. Eisenhower, 2 January 1952

President Eisenhower spoke at once to the American people and to the world, announcing that we could not have a dual standard of conduct – one for our friends and one for our enemies – but that there was to be a world order, one set of principles had to govern all.²

John Foster Dulles, 11 November 1956

On January 14, 1959, three months before resigning from the position of United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles appeared for the last time before an executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Whether or not it was consciously intended as a political testament by a politician mortally ill from cancer, the statement he made that day was nonetheless a vigorous defense of the foreign policy conducted during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency. At the same time it was a passionate declaration that United States foreign policy was not solely based on power political considerations or mere reactive containment of the Communist threat. “What attracts attention are the aggressive probings of the Communists and the Free World reactions thereto. That gives the impression that our foreign policy consists primarily of reacting

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to Communist initiatives. Nothing could be further from the truth,” Dulles asserted. Instead Dulles argued that progress was being made toward “establishing a world order” for “the interdependent world community of which we are part” to move “steadily toward lasting peace, orderly freedom and growing opportunity.”

As Dulles went on to further elaborate on this concept of a world order, he specifically pointed to United States policy during the Middle Eastern Suez Crisis of 1956, arguing that it could “well prove to be a historical landmark” in the unfolding of a new world order. During the Suez Crisis, in the early hours of November 4, 1956, the General Assembly of the United Nations engaged in a vote, which no doubt strikingly reflected the evolution of world politics after the Second World War. A resolution proposed by India and eighteen other mostly newly independent countries of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa demanded that two European great powers, France and Great Britain, end their military intervention in Egypt within the next twelve hours. The resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority of fifty-nine votes to five. Australia, New Zealand, and Israel voted with Britain and France; otherwise the world power and influence of the two great European imperial powers was not strong enough to gain any support. While Soviet tanks were gathering around Budapest to suppress the national uprising there, the United States representative found himself voting with the Soviet Union against NATO allies. “President Eisenhower spoke at once to the American people and to the world,” Dulles reflected a week later on Eisenhower’s speech at the height of the Suez Crisis, “announcing that we could not have a dual standard of conduct – one for our friends and one for our enemies – but that there was to be a world order, one set of principles had to govern all.”

As the Anglo-French attempt to regain control of the Suez Canal ended in failure, it was clear that the self-destruction of European power and authority in two world wars, global Cold War policies of the Soviet Union and the United States, and the rise of nationalism in the newly independent and remaining colonial areas had indeed changed the dynamics of world politics. It was this context of global change which provided the setting for American foreign

4 ibid.
5 Dulles, “Thoughts on a ‘Big Three’ Meeting,” 11 November 1956, op.cit.
policy during the years of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency from 1953 to 1961. It was also against the backdrop of this world of Cold War and decolonization that the American idea of a world order developed.

**World Order as a Conceptual Framework**

This is a study about the concepts and categories of thought which lay behind United States foreign policy during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency, from 1953 to 1961. By seeking connections between conceptual beliefs and political action, it analyzes the extent to which a tendency existed to evaluate political alternatives in terms of a conception of a possible world order – beliefs and assumptions regarding potential international harmony. A closely related question is whether this idea of intervention for reform, which covered a wide range of issues in the U.S. foreign policy spectrum, acquired instrumental importance in the making of foreign policy both generally and more specifically with regard to the Middle East.

The concepts central to this study address the relationship between nation-state societies and the international system. Thematically, ‘self-determination’, ‘collective security,’ and ‘leadership’ primarily reflect the relationship between national sovereignty and international power relations, as well as the international position of the United States. ‘Development’, ‘interdependence’, and ‘democracy’ refer to the relationship between national economy and socio-political development on the one hand, and international economic interdependence on the other. These concepts were all contested both internationally and domestically within the United States. All of them were used as political arguments both in the Cold War context and in debates about the nature and scope of decolonization. As this study is focussed on the United States and top-level foreign policy decision-making, it makes no pretense to do justice to the whole of that discourse and to all different viewpoints presented. The thesis does seek to demonstrate, however, the relevance and significant impact of both the domestic and the international debate regarding the content of these ideas on U.S. policy making. Therefore, these concepts open an avenue toward understanding United States foreign policy.

The study is organized to reflect an argument about the evolution of United States foreign policy toward the Middle East, with a focus on concepts which tied America’s Middle Eastern policies to the idea of world order. The central argument is that there existed a tendency to project this vision of a world order as a solution for perceived problems in given policy situations. In that process these concepts became problematic, required rethinking and also reoriented policy formation. The themes of self-determination, collective security, leadership, development, interdependence, and democracy run through the thesis, and in this sense the structure is chronological rather than thematic. The focus does, however, shift, reflecting the concurrent argument about the changing problematic of U.S. Middle Eastern policy as intertwined with the quest for principled international order.
I have sought to place this study at the intersection of political history and the history of ideas – between ideas and political action. It is consequently not intended as a study of abstract ideology or idealism. Rather, it studies the idea of a world order as it can be discerned in the actual political decision-making of U.S. foreign policy during the Eisenhower presidency. It is necessary to note that there never was any authoritative, comprehensive, and systematic exposition of the beliefs that made up the mentality of mid-twentieth-century American foreign policy makers. Therefore, by the strictest definitions of an ideological system, the idea of world order probably should not be called ideology. But if the persistence of the idea of world order is ignored, there is a risk of distorting and neglecting assumptions and aims that shaped mid-twentieth century United States foreign policies and activities in major ways. Even if one does not wish to establish causal determinacy between ideas and action, it seems plausible to argue that the intellectual matrix within which a given historical community operates, provides sources of action and parameters of policy.

The interpretative point of departure is that the meaning of a text or an act – political action – is not innate to that action, but dependent on the situation or context it is understood in. It is suggested here that the idea of world order can be understood as a such semantic mental map (or a series of overlapping mental maps) providing that horizon. As far as the purpose of studies covering political action is the retrieval of some of the historical identity of that action, then one should recognize that any act is bound to represent an individual response to a culturally specific constellation of issues. Culturally and socially bound conceptual conventions furnish means for assessment and choice, criteria by which judgments seem either problematic or coherent. These beliefs shape historical foresight, “horizons of expectation,” marking the limits to the field of action in which, at the moment, it is possible to see a change in human affairs as possible, probable, or feasible, and to decide which goals could be realized (ambition), or should be defended (fear). The existence of such systemic beliefs gives the confidence and assurance that through interference it is possible to produce or prevent changes in the world. And conversely, systemic beliefs make it possible to let the world change without interference by providing a horizon of expectation as to where the change is going to lead.7

The importance of horizons of expectation for this study lies not so much in their accuracy in describing or forecasting political and social change (a related but distinct question), but their strength in serving as theoretical bases for practical political decisions. Such search for larger contexts was also something that Eisenhower and Dulles consciously pursued. Eisenhower noted that his method was “to strip each problem down to its simplest possible form,” and “[h]aving gotten the issue well defined ... [t]rying then in the next step to determine what answer would best serve the long term advantage and welfare of the United States and the free world.”8 Dulles was convinced that “oftentimes matters which are insoluble in isolation become soluble in a larger context.”9 The focus here is on the extent to which the ideas of world order created a view of ‘available futures’ or ‘achievable futures’ consisting both those futures likely to happen ‘of themselves’ and those that are perceived as ones that potentially could be ‘made’ to happen if appropriate measures were taken.

It is of course essential to distinguish between what people thought was happening and what was actually happening. It is, moreover, necessary to distinguish between actual phenomena and the meaning invested in those phenomena. The following thesis will be mainly concerned with the meaning, and with the mentality or weltanschauung in terms of which actual phenomena were understood. Consequently this is primarily a study of an American conception of international politics, which seeks to understand and explain the American ‘reading’ of the world.

Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Administrative Context

The focus of this study is on concepts and contexts rather than biographical history or interest-group behavior. In terms of its sources, however, it is centered on the top-level of the decision-making process with two persons, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, standing out. Eisenhower was the hero general of the Allied forces during the Second World War, a military leader with almost unrivalled reputation and popularity. Born in Denison, Texas in 1890, he grew up in Abilene, Kansas, and

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8 See also Karl Mannheim’s argument in *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), 209–210, that “the innermost structure of a mentality of a group can never be as clearly grasped as when we attempt to understand its conception of time in the light of its hopes, yearnings, and purposes... Bare facts set themselves in perspective, and emphasis in meaning are distributed and apportioned to individual happenings in accordance with the fundamental directions in which the personality strives.” From the perspective of cognitive theory, Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor describe in *Social Cognition* (New York: Random House, 1984) how “consequences of alternative courses of action are assessed with the aide of causal beliefs. Belief systems serve the need for information, since expectations embedded in the belief system can be used to fill in gaps in information.”

9 Eisenhower to Alfred M. Gruenther (Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe), 1 February 1955, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary Series, Box 9, ‘DDE Diary (2), February 1955,’ Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
embarked on a military career after graduating from West Point in 1915. By the
time of the Second World War, Eisenhower was an experienced staff officer,
becoming the head of the war-plans division in Washington, before assuming
the command of the Allied forces first in North Africa and later in Western
Europe. He was Chief of Staff for the United States Army during the early
stages of the Cold War, but retired to become President of Columbia University
in 1948.

During his three years at Columbia University, Eisenhower remained an
active participant in and public speaker on international affairs. He was on close
terms with Defense Secretary James Forrestal, and chaired an influential study
group on economic aid to Europe for the Council on Foreign Relations in New
York. In 1951 Eisenhower accepted the offer to become the first NATO
Supreme Commander in Western Europe. Within a year he accepted
nomination as the Republican Party candidate for the presidency.  

Dulles’ resume on the diplomatic side was equally impressive. As
Eisenhower once remarked, Dulles had “spent his life in this work in one form
or another.” Grandson of President Benjamin Harrison’s secretary of state
John Foster, and nephew of Robert Lansing who held the same post in
Woodrow Wilson’s administration, Dulles was born in 1888 in Washington
D.C., while his grandfather was then Secretary of State. He grew up in northern
New York state, in Watertown, and studied at Princeton, the Sorbonne, and
George Washington University. Dulles accompanied his grandfather to the
Hague peace conference of 1911 and went with his uncle to another peace
conference at Versailles eight years later. During the First World War, Dulles
operated as a liaison officer between the General Staff and the Work-Trade
Board, becoming a specialist in economic diplomacy, working on issues related
to the blockade of Germany during the war and dealing with war reparations as
a counsel to Wilson’s team in Versailles.

Dulles entered the renown Wall Street legal firm Sullivan & Cromwell as a
clerk. Before retiring as a senior partner in 1949, he had spent the interwar
period working to a great extent on the economic stabilization and rehabilitation
loans that were made between private U. S. banks and foreign countries,
performing the type of service that was – as Dulles would later note to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee – performed after the Second World War
by governmental and intergovernmental foreign aid agencies. As one of the lay
leaders of the Presbyterian Church, Dulles also became well-known for his

9 Memorandum of conversation, 11 January 1956, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda
Series, Box 4, ‘Meetings with the President, January 1956 through July 1956 (5),’ Dwight D.
Eisenhower Library.
10 See especially Ambrose, Stephen, Eisenhowe: Soldier, General of the Army, President-
11 Eisenhower Diary, 10 January 1956, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary Series, Box 12,
‘Diary, January 1956,’ Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
12 For a fine treatment of Dulles’ early career, see Pruessen, Ronald W., John Foster Dulles:
The Road to Power (New York: Free Press, 1982).
activities in the world ecumenical movement.\textsuperscript{13} After the outbreak of the Second World War, Dulles became Chair of the Commission for a Just and Durable Peace set up by the Federal Council of Churches. President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked him to work on the United Nations Charter at the San Francisco conference, which led to continued involvement in the making of United States foreign policy. In fact, by the time he became Secretary of State in January 1953 he had accompanied his four predecessors to their first international conferences as secretaries of state. He had been to San Francisco with Stettinius, London with Byrnes, Moscow with Marshall, and Paris with Acheson. After spending a year as Senator from New York, Dulles lost his seat in the 1950 elections. He was asked to come back to work at the State Department, and was later put in charge of peace treaty negotiations with Japan.\textsuperscript{14}

As much as Eisenhower was the war hero and general, and Dulles the accomplished peace negotiator and diplomat, their public image after years in high political offices reflected that point of departure in ambiguous ways. Eisenhower, the military man, became known as the smiling, golf-playing president, who advocated fiscal restraint in military build-up and warned against the growth of the military-industrial complex in his farewell speech. His popularity had been demonstrated in two clear election victories, but actual policy questions had seemed hard for him to handle during press conferences. Dulles, the diplomat, had acquired a reputation as the quintessential intransigent cold warrior with an inclination toward tirades of crusading ideology. He had dominated the foreign policy decision making, it seemed, bringing concepts like ‘massive retaliation’, ‘roll-back’, and ‘liberation’ into the mainstream of American foreign policy discourse. He had publicly argued that diplomacy in the atomic age required the boldness to go to the brink of war, substituting ‘brinksmanship’ for ‘statesmanship’.\textsuperscript{15} Put together, these statements contributed to making Dulles one of the most notorious foreign policy leaders in American history. “[I]f only Dulles had not been Secretary of State,” wrote historian Gaddis Smith in 1973, it “might have brought an early end to the cold war, reduced the level of bloody tragedy in the Middle East, created a lasting settlement in Indochina, and prevented damaging strains to the Atlantic alliance.”\textsuperscript{16} Dulles and Eisenhower seemed like an odd couple, “rain and shine” in the words of \textit{Washington Post} cartoonist Herblock, or “the great golfer and the Presbyterian elder,” as Dean Acheson once remarked.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{14} ibid.


This picture has considerably changed since the opening of the Eisenhower era archives. Eisenhower clearly was much more in charge of the conducted policy than was believed to be the case. General policy lines and objectives were usually discussed and decided at the National Security Council (NSC) meetings which Eisenhower chaired, and during crisis periods the President assumed the responsibility and leadership in key decisions. The image of Dulles has also gradually changed. Most new studies portray him as more flexible and nuanced in his approach to international affairs than formerly believed, bringing about another problem of explaining the discrepancies between Dulles’ rhetoric and his apparently more cautious diplomatic practice. Dulles’ performances have sometimes been interpreted as intentional. The perception of Dulles as Eisenhower’s ‘lightning rod’, who attracted the majority of liberal criticism and secured right-wing support, should be coupled with frustrated remarks by Eisenhower and others about Dulles’ public overstatements which made him look like an “international prosecuting attorney.” Eisenhower’s adviser and sympathetic observer, C. D. Jackson, lamented that while Dulles was able to put up “a superb performance” in small settings, “how tragic it was that he did not possess the qualities to externalize this ability.”

There is, however, little doubt as to the mutual admiration and close working relationship between Eisenhower and Dulles. “I admire tremendously his wisdom, his knowledge in the delicate and intricate field of foreign relations, and his tireless dedication to duty,” Eisenhower wrote about Dulles to an old friend in 1958. For the purpose of this study the much-discussed decision-making relationship between Dulles and Eisenhower is of secondary interest compared to the similarity or dissimilarity of their political and social thought. In most cases, moreover, it seems that Dulles and Eisenhower worked closely together. Eisenhower himself noted that Dulles never made a serious pronouncement without “complete and exhaustive consultation with me in advance and, of course, my approval.” William Rountree, who was the longest serving assistant secretary of state for Middle Eastern affairs, concurred that Dulles consulted with the President on all matters of importance, being “quite meticulous in reporting to the President.”

20 Eisenhower to Swede Hazlett, 26 February 1958, Ann Whitman File, Name Series, Box 18, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
22 Eisenhower to Swede Hazlett, 23 October 1954, Ann Whitman File, Name Series, Box 18, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
According to Robert Bowie, the director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, Dulles worked closely with seven to nine people in the State Department, essentially drawn from the assistant secretaries assigned for different policy areas, and the head of the Policy Planning Staff. The normal routine was to have a paper prepared and circulated before a meeting was called. “Often the discussion would go on for an hour, or an hour and a half, or even two hours,” Bowie later said. “In the course of it there would be very lively give and take and expression of views all around, contesting of views among the advisors and with him.”24 Both Bowie and Rountree were impressed with the extent to which Dulles sought advice and counsel, and looked for forceful dissenting views in order to define his own.25

The list of State Department officials dealing with the Middle East shows considerable continuity from Truman to Eisenhower. All the key places were occupied by men who had served in European or Middle Eastern sections of the Department throughout the post-war era either in Washington or in American embassies. This continuity in the Middle Eastern section of the State Department was emphasized by the fact that the only assistant-secretary-of-state-level official who retained his position during the transfer of power from Truman to Eisenhower was Henry Byroade, who was in charge of the Middle East and later took up an important position as ambassador in Cairo. Additionally, the two top CIA officials of the Truman era – Walter Bedell Smith and Allen Dulles – both received high-ranking positions in Eisenhower’s administration. Smith moved to the State Department to become John Foster Dulles’ deputy, while Allen Dulles was promoted to head the CIA. While most of the high profile “wise men” of the Truman administration opted out or were left out of the new one, such well known Truman era officials and later Kennedy/Johnson administration members as Dean Rusk (Rockefeller Foundation) and Walt Rostow (economist at MIT) were at times closely involved in policy planning during the Eisenhower years. If one adds Dulles’ own experience as a member of Truman’s foreign policy team and Eisenhower’s tenure as commander of NATO’s European forces, the foreign policy elite of that era obviously shared a great deal of collective experience from the pre-1953 Cold War.

Dulles did not have a high regard for the institutional planning groups which had been organized within the Government. “The various so-called idea mechanisms that we have, like my own Policy Planning Board, have become completely useless as producers of ideas,” he complained in 1956, “because they have to spend all their time arguing in NSC Board Meetings, for the ultimate purpose of producing a piece of paper which represents the lowest

25 William Rountree Interview, 9 December 1965, op.cit., 7; Robert R. Bowie Interview, 10 August 1964, op.cit.
common denominator of agreement.”

Dulles was very active in cultivating a relationship with the representatives on Capitol Hill, but he was not sure whether Eisenhower’s attitude toward Congress was effective. Dulles noted that although Eisenhower himself would not move either way for personal political considerations, he became very careful in dealing with congressmen and senators in an election year.

In analyzing the influence of ideas on political action, it is worth noting that Eisenhower and Dulles felt very differently about the relationship between the administrative process and policy planning. Eisenhower apparently felt at ease with his position and liked to portray himself as being in control. Dulles complained, however, that bureaucratic regularities curtailed creative long-range policy planning. He admitted having found it difficult to reconcile long-term agendas with daily problems. “I have probably been better trained, and have trained myself better for this job than any living American,” Dulles admitted to C. D. Jackson in 1958. “Furthermore, I have a capacity for a very fast continuous work ... [a]nd yet I am just barely able to keep abreast. There are some days when literally I just manage to squeak through ... Long-range policy planning is what I should be working on, but I cannot...” Day-to-day demands could thus interfere with the search for a coherent policy.

Locating the Middle East in U. S. Foreign Policy

The post-World War II history of U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East is by no means a new terrain for scholarly activity. On the contrary, recurrent international crises in the area have created a significant body of literature dealing with different aspects of international relations. Despite scholarly interest, one aspect of the Middle East has remained ambiguous, and that is the term itself – the ‘Middle East’. During the Second World War the concept of the ‘Middle East’ had actually become an issue of debate in Anglo-American attempts to create unified geographic terminology covering the whole world. In response to a British proposal to abandon the term ‘Near East’ altogether, and substitute wider ‘Middle East’ for it, the State Department’s Geographer

considered it “quite unacceptable,” arguing that however widespread its use, “there is probably no term more ambiguous than Middle East.” Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1957, Dulles resorted to a two-year-old State Department definition, which stated that although it was necessary to be “somewhat arbitrary,” it was “safe to say that when the American Government thinks in terms of the Middle East, it is thinking about the area lying between and including Libya on the west and Pakistan on the east and Turkey on the north and the Arabian peninsula to the south.” A month later, a memorandum by the State Department Policy Planning Staff provided a problem-oriented definition most useful for the purposes of this study, arguing that the Middle East was defined on the basis that “the problems of the area overlap geographically, interact politically and tend to ramify throughout the area.” Moreover, “[n]o major area problem can be effectively dealt with in isolation from other area problems. In this context, Algeria and Kashmir are as much Middle Eastern problems as Palestine.”


34 State Department Policy Planning Staff Paper, ‘Some Considerations Bearing Upon the U.S. Approach to the Middle East,’ n.d., attached to Robert R. Bowie (Director, Policy Planning Staff) to William M. Rountree (Assistant Secretary of State, Near Eastern Affairs), 21 February 1957, State Department Decimal File 611.80/2–2157, RG 59, NARA.
Any interpretative overview of scholarship on U. S. policy toward the Middle East has to take into account the scholarly debate on the nature of U.S. foreign relations during the Cold War in general. While the intricacies of this debate, which has focussed on the origins of the Cold War, requires no elaboration here, the basic question of whether the postwar U.S. world role emerged as intervention for reform (for various purposes) or reaction to contain perceived threats (by various means) remains relevant for the purposes of this study too.\(^{35}\)

In general, while essentialist systemic explanations from both economics-oriented and power political (realist) viewpoints still remain influential in the background,\(^{36}\) most historians tend to frame their interpretations in terms of beliefs or belief systems rather than objectivist structures.\(^{37}\) Thus, despite emphases clearly linked to the above interpretative division, a ‘corporatist synthesis’ tends to follow the unfolding of an intellectual design for a new international economic order, while a ‘postrevisionist synthesis’ has been defined as analysis of geopolitical codes understood as assumptions about interests, potential threats and feasible responses.\(^{38}\) In terms of this study, however, the most intriguing questions are whether and in what manner these designs or assumptions of economic and geopolitical order were interrelated - as various historians have suggested - through values, ideals, ideology, culture, or language.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{37}\) For elaboration on the relationship between perception and reality in cold war historiography, see Hogan, “State of the Art,” 15.


Consensus reigns among scholars that both the Truman and Eisenhower eras meant years of increasing American influence and diplomatic activity in the Middle East. Moreover, there exists a common awareness of the general course of the Cold War and decolonization as they affected the Middle East. The decolonization process led to the relative decline and near collapse of the ‘old’ Western influence of France and Britain. The presence of the West in the area was transformed as American power and influence succeeded that of European imperial powers. The Cold War in the Middle East arguably entered a new era with United States initiatives with respect to military alliances, Soviet arms sales to radical Arab countries, Khrushchev’s nuclear threats during the Suez Crisis, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and United States intervention in Lebanon in 1958. These were also formative years for large scale foreign aid and development co-operation ventures in the Middle East, including encounters between intergovernmental financial institutions and local governments. Within the Middle East, new nationalist elites were gaining strength, characterized by mass following, distinctively more radical social programmes and more aggressive anti-colonialist rhetoric. These elites began asserting their power at the expense of more conservative rulers. Diverging views of the preferred nature of international society were manifested in the first large-scale nationalizations of Western-owned properties in Iran and Egypt, challenging and stretching Western conventions concerning international property rights and directly questioning the role of foreign investments in post-colonial societies.

Beyond these general trends, however, scholarly assessments of the Eisenhower Administration’s record in the Middle East have been diverse on almost every aspect, ranging from policy foundations and objectives to commonplace normative judgments, whether Eisenhower-Dulles policy was good or bad, successful or unsuccessful – or simply right or wrong within a given framework. The debate has generally evolved around the so-called ‘Eisenhower revisionism,’ denoting a more positive account of the Eisenhower presidency, usually emphasizing both Eisenhower’s restraint in crisis situations and his skills in decision-making.40


40 For an overview of the debate, see Rabe, Stephen G., “Eisenhower Revisionism: The Scholarly Debate,” Diplomatic History 17 (1993), 97–115. For the major works of ‘Eisen-
Probably the most often quoted critical argument is that Eisenhower’s policy reflected anticommunist Cold War reductionism, which resulted in failure to arrive “at a clear distinction between Communism and revolutionary Arab nationalism,” a failure which in Robert J. McMahon’s view led the United States to oppose both, not only in the Middle East but in Asia and Africa generally.41 In his prize-winning biography on Dulles, Townsend Hoopes argued in 1973 that Dulles had been engaged in a “frenzied effort to stifle the flames of national rebellion and revolution in the Third World.”42 In a similar vein Stephen Freiberger went as far as to claim that the Eisenhower Administration operated on “a counter-revolutionary and antinationalist” platform, seeking commercial advantage as well as opportunity to “replace the British.”43 David Lesch has also criticized Eisenhower Administration for Cold War reductionism in its dealings with local radical governments in the Middle East,44 prompting another area specialist, Diane Kunz, to note that new scholarship “should give pause to those scholars ready to canonize Eisenhower and find in Dulles a reconstructed pro-neutralist.”45

Among those approaching the problem from a geopolitical standard, John Lewis Gaddis criticizes Eisenhower for putting undue emphasis on United States economic interests and requirements “in terms both worthy of and gratifying to future New Left critics of American capitalism.” Moreover, although he acknowledges that the Eisenhower administration was much better aware of the problem of nationalism than was usually thought, Gaddis faults them for underestimating the ‘staying power’ of nationalism, and overestimating the tactical skills of the Communists.46 H. W. Brands and Peter Hahn have a very different view of Eisenhower’s geopolitical prowess. Brands argues contrary to Gaddis that the Eisenhower Administration worked in “a remarkably non-ideological fashion,” reflecting “primarily a geopolitical interpretation of American strategic, military, diplomatic, and economic interests.” In general, the United States showed insight and flexibility in its

44 Lesch, David, Syria and the United States: Eisenhower’s Cold War in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview, 1992), 210–211.
46 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 132.
relationships with the Third World and “demonstrated a pragmatic ability to deal with neutralism on its merits.” Peter Hahn has argued in a similar vein against those who have seen Eisenhower and Dulles in the context of traditional American anticolonialism. Although U. S. policy worked in Egypt’s favor during the Suez Crisis, Hahn writes, “the overriding objective during the crisis was containment of the Soviet Union, a strategic imperative, and not satisfaction of Egyptian aspirations.” Anticolonialism was not an end in itself, but an element of a grand strategy to prevent radicalization of nationalism and thus to combat communism.

Several scholars do, however, take anticolonialism seriously both as an ideological imperative and as an instrument for revising the prevailing international order. In stark contrast to Hahn’s argument, Wm. Roger Louis has concluded that Eisenhower and Dulles never wanted to antagonize nationalist sentiment in the Middle East, and that they “did not want to be associated in any way with the antiquated system of British and French colonialism that the United States, in their view, had historic reason to oppose.” Lloyd Gardner argues in a similar fashion that Dulles was “determined to gain full credit with the nationalist forces,” and pushed the British to make concessions with that in mind. In that Anglo-American confrontation, W. Scott Lucas concludes in his study on the Suez Crisis that Britain “paid the price of permanent subservience to American policy” because of its failure at Suez. Louis more or less agrees with this interpretation of the Anglo-American relationship. On the other hand, in an article published together with Ronald Robinson, he has emphasized that American anticolonialism was not intended primarily against Britain, but to channel decolonization in ways that would retain Western economic and strategic interests in the Middle East as well as in the rest of Asia and Africa in a reformed international order.

Despite strikingly different interpretations, this debate serves to indicate how the Cold War and processes of decolonization seemed – from the American perspective – to create a fluid and contested situation in the Middle East, exposing and exploiting Western fears of vulnerability. The relevance of this debate in terms of this study concerns the extent to which the Eisenhower administration believed in creating, and trying to implement an agenda of world

50 Gardner, Covenant with Power, 141
51 Lucas, W. Scott, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis (London: Hodder & Stoughton), 324.
order for the purpose of resolving the conflicts related to both the Cold War and decolonization. As Eisenhower argued in 1952, the question was whether the United States could create a program that would “take into account both the legitimate aspirations of these people and the practicalities of earning a living in the modern world,” and at the same time remain “appealing vis-a-vis the Russians, who are in effect offering nothing but political and social revolution.”